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Justice Jack B. Jacobs*
INTRODUCTION
I am greatly honored to be invited to speak to such a distinguished
audience of scholars at this highly regarded law school. Because I am
not an academic, and, in the scholarly realm, more of a dilettante, my
comments may more appropriately be regarded as light luncheon
entertainment. All I bring to the table is the perspective of a judge. For
eighteen years, before I went on the Delaware Supreme Court, I was a
Court of Chancery trial judge, where many of the cases I decided were
corporate law, and more specifically, fiduciary duty disputes. I still do
that, but not as much, since the Court of Chancery is only one of three
courts from which my current court hears appeals. The upside, though,
is that being an appellate judge gives one the luxury of more time to
think deeply. Appellate courts, unlike trial courts, do not have to
operate in “real time.”
From that perspective, I would like to share with you some
thoughts about a subject that I hope will interest you as legal scholars.
† This lecture was held at Fordham University School of Law on May 8, 2012. It was
edited to remove minor cadences of speech that appear awkward in writing and to
provide light references to explanatory materials.
* Justice, Supreme Court of Delaware. The lecturer’s remarks reflect his personal
views and not those of his court or his colleagues on the bench.
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The subject is the ongoing vitality of the implicitly empirical corporate
law model (or profile) of the shareholder base of publicly held U.S.
companies. What do I mean by that? For a long time, courts have
implicitly assumed a portrait of shareholders that has driven our
corporate law jurisprudence. Our decisions often speak of “the
shareholders,” and the duties that officers and directors owe to “the
shareholders.”1 But those cases rarely, if ever, explicitly identify
precisely whom we are talking about. Shareholders, as we all know,
come in many sizes, shapes, and flavors.
Since the early 1930s when the federal securities laws were
enacted, the implicit portrait or model underlying our corporate law
decisions has been that of a diffuse, disaggregated group of retail (“mom
and pop”) shareholders who, although educated and intelligent, are
financially unsophisticated and lack the power and motivation to
influence corporate governance or policy. Implicit in that picture was
the notion that those shareholders were long-term oriented, meaning
they were content to receive a return on their risk capital over the longer
term. It is that implicit, unstated portrait—that public company
shareholders as a group are unable to act collectively to protect
themselves2—which underlies the cardinal corporate law principle that
courts must be the agency to protect shareholders against overreaching
fiduciaries.
My thesis today is that, however accurate that model may have
been in the past, it is now inconsistent with the reality on the ground and
has been for some time. Our capital markets are now “deretailized.”
Today, the shareholder base of U.S. public companies consists of
highly-sophisticated institutions that have the resources and power—
both economic and legal—to act collectively and influence governance.
These institutions are also highly short-term oriented. The question
becomes: what implications does this new reality have for the
formulation and application of judge-made fiduciary duty principles?
My hope is to persuade you, as corporate law scholars, that this subject
merits your attention.

1. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993),
modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994), aff’d sub nom, Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
2. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 409–11 (1983).
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My talk comes in two parts. The first will flesh out this new
shareholder reality and how it came about. The second will ponder what
effect, if any, it may have for corporate law theory and judicial decisionmaking.
THE NEW REALITY
Our current shareholder model evolved from a reality that arose in
the wake of World War II. After 1945, the U.S. economy experienced
its historically highest level of growth. That led to the emergence of the
American middle class, which, in turn, generated unprecedented and
widespread investments in our capital markets by retail, “mom and
pop,” investors who typically purchased shares in relatively small
blocks. As noted, those shareholders were widely dispersed, were
unable to act collectively to influence management or governance
policy,3 and had a long-term investment horizon. That is, they were
content to leave managements to grow the firm over the longer term,
and with it, the value of their investments, with the goal of funding their
retirement and their children’s college education.
Beginning in the late 1960s, that reality began to change. A
confluence of events and forces gradually transformed the public
company shareholder base I have just described into what it is today,
notably a concentrated group of activist, institutional investors with a
short investment horizon. These institutions are empowered—and
willing to use that power—to influence their portfolio companies’
managements to govern in a manner consistent with their short-term
horizons. There is no single cause of that transformation. Several
developments combined to cause it.
One of those developments was the “deretailization” of the
American securities market.4 That came about because retail investors
also had full-time jobs and little time or expertise to manage their own
investment portfolios. In response to that need, a new industry arose:
professional, institutional investment managers, who performed that

3.
4.

Id.
”Deretailization” was coined by Brian Cartwright, former General Counsel of
the SEC, in an address to the University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law
and Economics. See Brian G. Cartwright, Gen. Counsel, SEC, Address at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law and Economics: The Future
of
Securities
Regulation
(Oct.
24,
2007)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102407bgc.htm).
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service for, and ultimately supplanted, the retail investors as the direct
shareholders of our publicly held corporations.
To illustrate, in 1951, individual retail investors owned over 75% of
all outstanding corporate equities in the United States; by 1979,
institutional investors as a group owned over 36%.5 Today, institutional
investors, including public and private pension and retirement funds,
mutual funds and hedge funds, control nearly 70%. Those institutions
are managed by persons or firms whose compensation depends on
generating short-term returns from the portfolio company stocks that
these institutions manage. Those compensation arrangements create
incentives for institutional investors to exert pressure on portfolio
corporate managements and boards to deploy corporate assets and to
develop business strategies to yield short-term profits, often at the
expense of profits over the longer term.
Those incentives have been enhanced and amplified at the portfolio
company level by executive compensation arrangements, and also by
pressures from the stock analyst community. As we know, corporate
executives are typically compensated with a package of cash and stock,
weighted (primarily for tax reasons) in favor of stock and stock options.
That creates incentives for corporate executives to manage their
companies in a way designed to increase (or at least not lower) their
companies’ stock price. Amplifying these incentives is the stock analyst
industry, which scrutinizes reported corporate quarterly earnings
statements to see if the quarterly results meet management projections.
If they do not, management gets an adverse report (the equivalent of a
bad grade) that is often followed by a sell recommendation that sends
the stock price downward.
But other factors also drive the short-term perspective of these
powerful institutions, wearing their hats as portfolio company
shareholders. Another factor is that those institutions hold their
portfolio shares only for a short period of time. Today, the rate of
turnover of invested portfolio stock is extremely high. At actively
managed mutual funds, which constitute the primary investor in U.S.
401(k) retirement funds, the annual turnover is about 100%. From a
broader perspective, the average turnover of all stocks traded on the
New York Stock Exchange reached 138% per year in 2008, and
5. John Armour et al., The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed
and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 219, 240
(2011).
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currently sits around 73% per year.6 The annual investment turnover by
hedge funds is about 300%.7 My point is that today’s shareholder base
consists primarily of institutional investors that have no long-term
commitment to the corporations in which they invest. Clearly, the
model of the passive, patient retail investor has given way to a new
reality.
To round out this picture, one other important fact must be
considered: these institutional shareholders have become both
economically and legally empowered.
They are economically
empowered because voting control is concentrated in a relatively small
group. As a former SEC General Counsel once observed, the
representatives of the institutions holding a majority of the shares of
U.S. public corporations could fit into a room smaller than this one.8
And, they have become legally empowered because of structural
changes in the legal environment that occurred during the last fifteen
years or so. Those legal changes have given public company
shareholders the tools to influence corporate boards and managements to
be more responsive to their agendas.
These developments have been both judicial and statutory, and they
have occurred at both the state and the federal levels. Ironically, these
developments, if viewed in isolation, are reforms that have laudable
merit and were warmly welcomed by both the shareholder and academic
communities. My purpose here, however, is not to debate the merits of
these developments, but merely to describe them and put them into
perspective. To sharpen this point, I focus on only two recent
developments: first, the increased use of the shareholder by-law process
to limit the power of boards to adopt governance rules, including
takeover defenses; and second, the new rules providing for shareholder
proxy access and proxy expense reimbursement.
For several years, the activist shareholder community has sought to
influence the governance of publicly held corporations through the bylaw amendment process. The legal predicate for that effort is the fact
that the Delaware General Corporation Law authorizes shareholders to

6. NYSE Share Turnover Since 1900, AVONDALE ASSET MANAGEMENT (Oct. 10,
2012), http://www.avondaleam.com/2012/06/nyse-share-turnover-since-1900.html.
7. Alliance Bernstein, Hedge Funds: Finding the Right Allocation, THE
BERNSTEIN JOURNAL: PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTING AND WEALTH MANAGEMENT, Fall
2005, at 12, 14, available at https://www.alliancebernstein.com/ResearchPublications/CMA-created-content/PrivateClient/PDFs/Bernstein_Journal_Fall05.pdf.
8. See Cartwright, supra note 4.
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adopt and amend by-laws, and provides that the board cannot eliminate
or limit that power.9 For over a decade, institutional shareholders have
invoked that authority to limit the board’s power to adopt poison pills.10
Typically proposed and passed is a by-law providing that any boardadopted pill will have a fixed duration, and that a shareholder vote will
be required to adopt any new pill or revive one that has expired.11 That
effort has, by and large, been successful: a large percentage of public
companies have dismantled their poison pills.
Institutional shareholders have also used the by-law amendment
process to reform the proxy election system to require the corporation to
reimburse the expenses of any shareholder group that nominates a “short
slate” of board candidates who are then successfully elected. That has
significantly leveled the playing field by reducing the expenses of
dissident groups seeking to wage a proxy contest. In 2008, the
Delaware Supreme Court held that proxy reimbursement was a proper
subject for shareholder action and would not impermissibly infringe the
board’s statutory power to manage the affairs of the corporation so long
as the by-law does not restrict the board from discharging its fiduciary
duties.12 As a consequence of that decision, the shareholder by-law
process was legitimated as a matter of Delaware law, as a tool to enable
activist shareholders to alter the composition of the board and thereby
exert leverage to influence board decisions.
These proxy reform tools have recently been codified into
legislation at both the state and federal levels. In 2009, the Delaware
General Assembly adopted Sections 112 and 113 of the General
Corporation Law.13 Like the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in CA
Inc. v. AFSCME, these statutes operate to reduce the cost of waging a
proxy contest by a dissident shareholder group. Section 112 enables a
9.
10.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2012).
See Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and
Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205, 205 (2005). See also id. at 209 (“The poison
pill is “the most potent of antitakeover defenses. If a corporation has a poison pill and a
hostile bidder acquires enough of the corporation’s shares to trigger the pill, other
shareholders will have the right to buy more shares at below-market prices, meaning
that the bidder must buy those shares as well. Alternatively, the pill could trigger the
right to purchase more shares of the bidder at low prices
after a merger has occurred, diluting the value of the bidder’s current shareholdings.”).
11. Id. at 210.
12. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 238 (Del. 2008).
13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112, 113.
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corporation to adopt by-laws that prescribe the conditions and
procedures for including dissident shareholder groups’ proxy materials
in the management proxy materials—which support the board’s director
nominee slate—at company expense.14 For dissident shareholders that
wish to conduct their own proxy solicitation (think Pershing Square or
Icahn), Section 113 permits the adoption of by-laws that authorize the
corporation to reimburse the dissident group’s proxy solicitation
expenses under conditions prescribed in the by-law.15 Importantly, these
statutes provide that, where shareholders adopt such by-laws, the
directors cannot repeal them.
What the Delaware Legislature made optional, the U.S. Congress
made mandatory one year later in the Dodd-Frank Act.16 Section 971 of
Dodd-Frank authorizes the SEC to adopt proxy access rules. Although
to date the SEC’s rulemaking process has had a rocky start,17 at some
point we may have to contend with a preemptive federal “one size fits
all” regulation that mandates public companies to include shareholder
proposals in their company proxy materials.
To conclude this first part, our current public company shareholder
profile has eclipsed the model that came into existence after World War
II. A new reality has evolved that differs profoundly from what existed
before. Yet—and the critical fact is—that outdated portrait is still the
model that continues to underlie our corporate fiduciary law
jurisprudence. That brings me to my second and final topic, which is:
what are the implications of that new reality for crafting judge-made
fiduciary law decisions? More specifically, should our shareholder
profile model be modified to conform to the new reality, and if so, then
how and to what extent? For me, this is a brand new conceptual area. I
therefore freely confess that what I offer today are more questions than
answers. But even so, I hope to persuade you, as scholars, that this
question is worthy of your attention.

14.
15.
16.

Id. § 112.
Id. § 113.
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
17. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding thatthe
SEC “acted arbitrarily and capriciously for having failed once again . . . adequately to
assess the economic effects of a new rule.”).

26

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVIII

A NEW MODEL
If I were you, I would probably be asking myself: is this really a
problem? That is a good question, and I would respond to it in this way:
legal theory, like scientific theory, inescapably rests upon, and is tested
by, an empirical foundation—that is, by some view of how the world
actually works.18 In science, it is axiomatic that if the empirical data
does not support a theory, then the theory must be modified to conform
to the data. By analogy, a corporate fiduciary legal theory is grounded
upon an empirical model or assumption about how human beings
actually behave and react to events. Building on that analogy, I would
suggest that if the model no longer corresponds to the reality, then the
theory may no longer be sound and should be reexamined. That is my
position. If you disagree, then you will probably find the rest of this talk
of minimal value.
But (and as I hope), if you do agree, we would reach the second
question: even if the current shareholder model no longer conforms to
the current reality, how do we go about determining whether, and if so
how, the shareholder model needs to be changed? As a cautious, riskaverse judge, my answer would be: one small step at a time.
What do I mean? That is, how might one go about performing a
fiduciary analysis that takes this new shareholder profile into account?
At this very preliminary stage in my own thinking, I would suggest the
following thought experiment: let us consider three separate, wellunderstood fact paradigms that have arisen in Delaware corporate law. I
will briefly walk you through each of them, and then conclude.
The first fact paradigm is classic Unocal19: a board adopts defenses
against a hostile takeover. A shareholder class (and the hostile bidder)
sues, claiming the board breached its fiduciary duty by interfering with
the shareholders’ right to sell their shares at a premium above current
market price.20 In this area, our case law is quite paternalistic, in the
sense that it is highly shareholder protective. Beginning with Unocal in
1985, Delaware courts have consistently held that the target company
board has not only the power but also the duty to protect the
shareholders against hostile offers that the board reasonably believes
18. See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the
Common Law of Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499 (2002).
19. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
20. See id. at 949–52.
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pose a threat to corporate policy. And, the board may do that by
adopting proportionate defensive measures.21
The Unitrin case exemplifies this paternalistic approach.22 There,
the Delaware Supreme Court held that a target board has the prerogative
to determine that the market undervalues the target company’s stock,
and may protect its shareholders from offers that do not reflect the
corporation’s long term value under management’s business plan.23 But,
the Unitrin Court went even further. It held that the target company
board’s entitlement to defend, and thereby prevent the shareholders from
deciding on their own whether or not to accept the hostile bid, could be
justified on a theory of “substantive coercion.”24 I refer to the concept
that the shareholders might accept the hostile bidder’s inadequate offer
“because of ‘ignorance or mistaken belief’ regarding the Board’s
assessment of the long term value of [the target company’s] stock.”25
Clearly that paternalistic fiduciary duty approach rests on a model
of target company shareholders as being diffuse, financially
unsophisticated, and powerless to protect themselves—in the words of
one Delaware judge, as having “rube-like qualities.”26 The question is
whether, given the reality of today’s shareholder profile, the
shareholder-protective premise that underlies the Unocal doctrine in
paradigm takeover defense cases has continued vitality.
At least one Chancery case has addressed that question, although
not at the theoretical level. In Chesapeake Corporation v. Shore,27 then
Vice Chancellor (now Chancellor) Strine was confronted with a
substantive coercion argument. In Chesapeake, the target board
adopted, as a takeover defense, a supermajority voting rule for
shareholder-proposed amendments to the by-laws. The board justified
that defense on the basis that the bid was inadequate and posed the
threat that the shareholders and the capital markets would not fully
understand the superior dollar value of management’s business plan as
compared to the hostile offer. The Chancellor rejected that argument,
not on theoretical grounds, but on the basis that the board had produced
no evidence that there was any risk of shareholder confusion. That is,

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 957–58.
Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
Id.
See id. at 1383–85.
Id. at 1385.
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 328 (Del. Ch. 2000).
Id.
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the court did not consider itself bound to accept without question a
defense based on an abstract fiduciary theory that was untethered to
empirical facts. Chesapeake may be viewed as one example of a court
rejecting, on empirical grounds, the traditional shareholder model that
implicitly justified the exercise of fiduciary power to defend against a
hostile bid. Whether the Supreme Court would have validated that
approach will never be known, because Chesapeake was never
appealed.
But suppose it had been? In that event, my court might have been
called upon to reexamine an underlying theoretical premise of Unocal—
that courts must give deference to a target board’s determination that a
hostile bid poses a threat that justifies a defensive response. Chesapeake
rejected that deferential approach insofar as it refused to credit the
claimed substantive coercion threat solely on the basis of the target
board’s say-so. Chesapeake, I would suggest, can be viewed as
obliquely challenging the validity of the shareholder profile model on
which the substantive coercion theory rests. That case also illustrates
one way a court might respond analytically to the disjunction between
fact and theory. Is such a response the best approach? At this point my
own thinking is too undeveloped to say. But what I can say is that
Chesapeake gives effect to the view that the new shareholder profile
reality has overtaken the empirical model that implicitly undergirds an
important theoretical premise of Unocal.
I next turn to a second fact paradigm, which is rooted in Revlon.28
A target board decides to sell the target company as a response to a
hostile bid. That provokes a bidding war, and the target board agrees to
sell the company to the low bidder that (for whatever reason) the board
prefers to deal with. A shareholder class (and the disfavored high
bidder) sue, claiming a breach of fiduciary duty under Revlon and its
progeny. Those cases hold that the courts must protect shareholders
from fiduciary decisions to sell the company in a transaction that will
not yield the highest available value. Again, the question for us is
whether, given the new shareholder profile reality, the degree of
shareholder protection afforded in Revlon-type cases is still appropriate.
In this setting, unlike Unocal, a good argument can be made that
the new shareholder reality should not matter either to the analysis or the
result. Why? Because in this scenario, the directors have contractually
28. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986).
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committed the company to a sale transaction that involves deal
protection measures. Those measures would be triggered if an offeror
with a superior bid prevails over the favored bidder that is offering less.
As a result, the unsuccessful bidder, even if it loses the company, will
reap the benefits of the deal protection measures.
QVC29 is the quintessential example. Under the merger agreement
there, the favored bidder, Viacom, had contractual deal protections that
would enable Viacom to walk away with over $1 billion of target
company assets if the competing bidder, QVC, won the bidding war for
the company. In those circumstances, only the courts, and not the
institutional shareholders—however empowered or sophisticated they
might be—have the power to prevent that from happening. So, the
answer for the Revlon fact paradigm may differ from that in Unocaltype cases.
But, I do not mean to oversimplify. There may be other forms of
Revlon-type M&A transactions where the need for shareholder
protection is less compelling. Time does not permit me to explore or
elaborate that thought here, except to say that the relevant inquiry would
be whether, given the new shareholder profile reality, the shareholders
as a group are able and motivated to protect themselves without court
intervention. In cases where the answer is yes, the courts will be
challenged, doctrinally speaking, either to formulate an exception to
Revlon in those cases or to articulate a new governing theoretical
concept.
The third, and final, paradigm situation I will address involves the
“going private” transactional cases. A controlling stockholder acquires
the minority shares in a merger or an economically equivalent set of
transactions. For our purposes, these going private cases may be
divided into two subcategories. In the first—a long-form merger of the
target company into an entity controlled by the controlling
shareholder—the profile of the stockholder base is probably irrelevant.
In the second—a two-step transaction consisting of a tender offer
designed to elevate the controlling stockholder’s interest to 90%,
followed by a short-form merger—the composition or profile of the
shareholder base may be highly relevant to the fiduciary analysis.
To better understand why, consider the classic “long-form” merger.
Here the controlling shareholder, a fiduciary, has the raw power to force
the minority shareholders to accept the merger on whatever financial
terms, however unfair, the controller desires. In these circumstances,
29.

Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
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the shareholders, whether they be institutions or individuals, are
powerless to change the result by self-help, since the majority
stockholder has the voting power to dictate the result. In this setting, the
nature of the shareholder profile would appear irrelevant. The only
protection available is through the courts, which would require the
fiduciary to prove that the merger is objectively and entirely fair, both as
to process and price.30
But now consider a second transactional form through which a
buyout of the minority interest may be accomplished. Under that form
the nature of the shareholder profile may matter greatly. I refer to a
two-step Siliconix-type transaction, where the controlling shareholder
first makes a tender offer for enough minority shares to raise its
ownership to the 90% level, and then follows up with a “short-form”
merger. Under Delaware law, neither step, if considered separately, is
subject to entire fairness review.31 The question is: should the courts
view these two steps separately, in which case there would be no
fairness review, even though the economic result is precisely the same
as a single step going private merger? Or, should the courts disregard
the separateness of the two transactions and treat them collectively as if
they were a single acquisition requiring fairness review? The Supreme
Court has not yet addressed this question; the Court of Chancery has.
This development began only recently, in 2001, with the Siliconix
decision, which treated each transactional step separately, with each step
governed by different review standards prescribed by Supreme Court
precedent.32 Later Chancery cases embroidered and modified Siliconix.
In all these cases the Court of Chancery was fully mindful of the risk
that this novel two-step approach could deprive shareholders of the
protections afforded by classic fairness review. Therefore, in postSiliconix decisions, that court imposed, on a case-by-case basis,
additional disclosure requirements and structural protections that

30.
31.

See generally Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001) (holding
there is no fairness review required in a short-form merger); Solomon v. Pathe
Commc’ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996) (holding there is no fiduciary duty to offer a
fair price in a tender offer involving full disclosure and no coercion).
32. In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CIV. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787
(Del. Ch. June 19, 2001).
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Since the
incorporated de facto certain elements of fairness review.33
Supreme Court has yet to address the merits of this alternative doctrinal
pathway to achieving the identical economic result as the classic going
private merger, I disclaim any comment on the merits. I describe this
transactional form merely to illustrate, on a hypothetical basis, how the
new shareholder reality might factor into a fiduciary duty analysis in a
concrete setting.
This two-step acquisition format differs from the classic one-step
long form merger in one important respect: it requires the minority
shareholders to tender enough shares for the controller to reach the 90%
level. If, as the traditional model assumes, the shareholders are
disaggregated, unsophisticated retail investors unable to protect
themselves, then the types of shareholder procedural protections
reflected in the Siliconix line of cases would be justified. But, if the
minority shares are held primarily by sophisticated institutions, then all
those institutions need do to prevent the controller from reaching the
90% level is refuse to tender their shares. Under that hypothesis,
perhaps the inquiry should be: (i) do the institutions have sufficient
shares to prevent the offer from succeeding, and (ii) if so, are the
institutions motivated to withhold their shares in order to force a better
price, and are there any obstacles to their doing so? One might advance
a counterargument that this kind of analysis is too costly and imposes
undue case management burdens on the courts. But that would be a
debate for another day. My modest proposition is only that the new
shareholder profile is an irrefutable reality that justifies inquiring into
whether courts should take that into account in formulating and applying
fiduciary duty principles.
****
I will stop at this point and leave you with one final thought. If
there is merit to the notion that courts should take into account the new
shareholder reality in formulating and applying fiduciary doctrine, it is
also true that courts can accomplish that only on a case-by-case basis. A
downside of the common law process is that it risks balkanizing into
small pieces, a larger set of issues that are perhaps better viewed in more
33. In re Pure Resources, Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002); In
re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005); In re CNX Gas
Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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comprehensive theoretical terms. That is why, in my opinion, the
judiciary would profit by having the benefit of a systemic academic
analysis of these conceptual questions, rather than addressing them on
an ad hoc basis. That important endeavor will require a degree of
analytical firepower that the legal academy is uniquely situated to
provide.

